



HMAC-SHA-1HRS Deduplication Scheme in Cloud

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the inherent characteristic of electronic medical records (EMRs) from actual electronic health (eHealth) systems, where we found that (1) multiple patients would generate large amounts of duplicate EMRs and (2) cross-patient duplicate EMRs would be generated numerously only in the case that the patients consult doctors in the same department. We then propose the first efficient and secure encrypted EMRs deduplication scheme for cloud-assisted eHealth systems (HealthDep). With the integration of our analysis results, HealthDep allows the cloud server to efficiently perform the EMRs deduplication, and enables the cloud server to reduce storage costs by more than 65% while ensuring the confidentiality of EMRs. Security analysis shows that HealthDep is more secure than the Marforio et al.'s scheme (NDSS 2014) and Bellare et al.'s scheme (USENIX Security 2013). Algorithm implementation and performance analysis demonstrate the feasibility and high efficiency of HealthDep.

Keywords: -Admin, Doctor, Appointment, De-duplication, Cloud Storage.

1. INTRODUCTION

Applying Internet of Things (IoT) technologies with the integration of cloud computing in various industries has already shown great potential in improving the quality of services in these industry systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. One of the most prominent manifestations is the cloud-assisted electronic health (eHealth) systems [5], [6]. Such systems provide a more efficient, less error-prone, and more reliable way to manage electronic medical records

(EMRs) for both healthcare providers and patients, compared with traditional paper based systems. Specifically, cloud-assisted eHealth systems not only allow medical institutions to outsource EMRs to the storage server and access them flexibly without incurring substantial storage and maintain costs in practice [7], but also make a great contribution to the judgement and dispute resolution in medical malpractice [8]. Generally, the storage server needs to store the outsourced EMRs, such as



prescriptions, for a prolonged period of time to satisfy several government regulations or hospital requirements on EMRs archiving. With the volume of EMRs generated from Health systems grows over time, the costs of storing EMRs are persistently increase in practice. Actually, the storage costs can be reduced significantly after deduplication, where the storage server checks duplicate EMRs and deletes the redundant ones. For example, as shown in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b), both two patients (one is diagnosed with coronary heart disease and stable angina pectoris, and the other one is diagnosed with hypertension) need to use “Aspirin Enteric-coated Tablets”, “Metoprolol Tartrate Tablets”, and “Nifedipine Sustained-release Tablets” with the same usage and dosage. Table I shows the savings of storage costs that performing deduplication on prescriptions from an actual eHealth system, these prescriptions are selected randomly from 10000 prescriptions generated by doctors from Department of Cardiology during 2013-2017. The results demonstrate that the storage costs can be reduced by more than 66% in the case of 500 prescriptions. However, from the perspective of data owners including both medical institutions and patients, the content

of EMRs should not be leaked for security reasons. Therefore, privacy protection of the EMRs' content against anyone who does not own the EMRs should be guaranteed. This can be achieved by conventional encryption, but its randomness (i.e. for the same message, different users produce different ciphertexts) makes deduplication impossible.

2. RELATED WORK

Existing System

Generally, the storage server needs to store the outsourced EMRs, such as prescriptions, for a prolonged period of time to satisfy several government regulations or hospital requirements on EMRs archiving. With the volume of EMRs generated from Health systems grow over time, the costs of storing EMRs are persistently increased in practice. Actually, the storage costs can be reduced significantly after de-duplication, where the storage server checks duplicate EMRs and delete the redundant ones.


Proposed System:

In this paper, we propose the first efficient and secure encrypted EMRs deduplication scheme for cloud-assisted eHealth systems, and realize it in a system called HealthDep. In HealthDep, multiple dedicated key servers are introduced to assist in

generating MLE keys, where these key servers share a secret via a distributed protocol and the MLE key is generated by the EMR itself and the secret jointly through an oblivious protocol. This guarantees that the confidentiality of outsourced EMRs cannot be violated by brute-force attackers when one or more key servers are compromised, and therefore provides a stronger security guarantee compared with existing schemes. We also analyze the medical data existing in actual eHealth systems. The key observation from the analysis is that patients consulted the doctors with the same department would generate numerous duplicate EMRs, while patients consulted the doctors with the different departments would generate few duplicate EMRs.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

System Architecture



Appointment

Now we illustrate the procedure when a patient consults a doctor in HealthDep. First, the patient registers with a hospital, and the hospital determines that the patient is subject to which department. Then the hospital designates a doctor for diagnosing, and the patient makes an appointment with the hospital to obtain the diagnosing information (e.g. time and place).

Delegation

At the corresponding time, the patient delegates to the doctor, and is diagnosed and treated. Then the doctor generates the EMRs for the patient, performs a server-aided MLE to encrypt the EMRs, and outsources the ciphertexts to storage server.

De-duplication

This algorithm enables the doctor to generate and encrypt EMRs for each patient and outsource the ciphertexts to the storage server, and allows the storage server to perform ciphertext de-duplication to reduce the storage overhead.

Methodology

- **TokenGen(Tag, UserID)** - It loads the associated privilege keys of the user and generate the token with HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm.

• **ShareTokenGen(Tag, {Priv.})** - It generates the share token with the corresponding privilege keys of the sharing privilege set with HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm.

Public Server (Storage Server):

Our implementation of the Storage Server provides deduplication and data storage with following handlers and maintains a map between existing files and associated token with Hash Map.


• **DupCheck(Token)** - It searches the File to Token Map for Duplicate and

• **FileStore(FileID, File, Token)** - It stores the File on Disk and updates the Mapping.

HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm

The working of HMAC starts with taking a message M containing blocks of length b bits. An input signature is padded to the left of the message and the whole is given as input to a hash function which gives us a temporary message digest MD' . MD' again is appended to an output signature and the whole is applied a hash function again, the result is our final message digest MD .

Here is a simple structure of HMAC:



Here, H stands for Hashing function,

M is original message

S_i and S_o are input and output signatures respectively,

Y_i is the i th block in original message M , where i ranges from $[1, L)$

L = the count of blocks in M

K is the secret key used for hashing

IV is an initial vector (some constant)

The generation of input signature and output signature S_i and S_o respectively.

$$S_i = K^+ \oplus ipad \quad \text{where } K^+ \text{ is nothing but } K \text{ padded with zeros on the left so that the result is } b \text{ bits in length}$$

$$S_o = K^+ \oplus opad \quad \text{where } ipad \text{ and } opad \text{ are } 00110110 \text{ and } 01011100 \text{ respectively taken } b/8 \text{ times repeatedly.}$$

$$MD' = H(S_i || M)$$

$$MD = H(S_o || MD') \quad \text{or } MD = H(S_o || H(S_i || M))$$

4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS



Fig: -2 Application Dashboard




Fig: -3 Updating Medicine Information



id	name	prescription	qty	hashvalue	phone
1	crocin	3/2m*20z	2	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
2	paracetamol	4/2m*10z	5	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
3	betanilon	2/4m*10z	3	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
4	dolokind	@prescription	4	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
5	@prescription	@prescription	6	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
6	@prescription	@prescription	8	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
7	@prescription	@prescription	9	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999
8	@prescription	@prescription	5	9e9f0e2b2e33a737f0c6a68fe7d0d7d47e95a9af9f0c110d0e0d0c0	999999

Fig: -4 HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm Results

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed the first secure and efficient encrypted EMRs deduplication scheme for cloud-assisted eHealth systems, namely HealthDep. HealthDep is able to resist brute-force attacks without suffering from the singlepoint-of-failure problem; the patients in HealthDep make use of their smartphones to secure delegation and MLE keys. We have analyzed EMRs in actual eHealth systems and pointed out that patients consulted the doctors with the same department would generate numerous duplicate EMRs, while patients consulted the doctors with the different departments would generate few duplicate EMRs, which is integrated into HealthDep to improve the performance that the storage server checks duplicate EMRs. We have provided implementation to demonstrate the feasibility of HealthDep, and conducted a comprehensive performance comparison between HealthDep and the existing schemes, which has shown that HealthDep provides a strong security guarantee with a high efficiency.

6. REFERENCES

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