

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS FOR INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ABSTRACT

Intelligence skills are fundamental to the successful execution of national security policy. Threats to national security must be warned of, policymakers and the military must be given the resources they need to defeat such threats, and diplomatic efforts must be given the information they need to succeed. When faced with threats to national interests and security, decision-makers, military commanders, and policy analysts at all levels depend on the intelligence community to gather information and give strategic and tactical analysis that they cannot get anywhere else. President Clinton said in his 1996 document, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, that "intelligence producers must develop closer relationships with the users of intelligence to make products more responsive to consumer needs." In the current post-cold-war geopolitical landscape, nothing President Clinton said could be more accurate. Knowledge of potential destabilizing influences is essential in every field, from the business sector to national security. A well-oiled intelligence apparatus and a proactive national mind-set are required to organize such foresight. To avoid any unwelcome shocks on the path to increased peace and security, it is in the nation's best interest to sketch and assess long-term intelligence views.

KEYWORDS: Intelligence Apparatus, National Security Council, decision-makers, military commanders

Intelligence Gathering

Gathering raw data is the first step in the intelligence process (Figure 1), which then undergoes selection to become collected data. This is then gathered, checked, compiled, and sent on to the right people. These few words describe a process that is in fact intricate, exciting, labor-intensive, and prohibitively costly. 10 Intelligence gathering has long been a traditional governmental responsibility. Up until that point, gathering information had remained quite simple and rather pedestrian. The War in Europe is Over. With the advancement of science and technology after World War II, intelligence collection naturally got more intricate and

multifaceted. A few short decades ago, data collecting was widely regarded as one of governments' top priorities. The scenario has undergone a dramatic shift as a result of the tremendous technological revolution in information collecting tools.




Figure 1: Intelligence Process



Even more importantly, only around 10–15 percent of the wide variety of data most governments demand or need necessitates expensive, sophisticated technical techniques; the rest of it is accessible in publically disclosed form, one way or another. Therefore, nowadays the issue is not a lack of information but rather an abundance of it. The true challenge is not in gathering the data, but rather in organizing it, analyzing it, making sense of it, and retrieving it. Separating relevant information from irrelevant information is the crux of contemporary intelligence practice. 12 Now, more than ever before in human history, it is crucial to comprehend how intelligence operates.

Intelligence Gathering Machinery

There is often a governmental intelligence agency and a military intelligence organization. One organization is responsible for obtaining external intelligence on political, economic, and technical trends as well as the geo-strategic military might of existing or future rivals, while a another organization is charged with gathering information on internal developments. In addition to these organizations, a wide range of government ministries and departments rely on systematic data collecting to carry out their day-to-day operations. All sophisticated nations have something like to national-level evaluation boards, at least in theory, even if their actual structures are different. There is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in Britain, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in Canada, the Executive Committee for Intelligence and Security Services (CESIS) in Italy, the Research and Political Planning Center (RPPC) in Israel, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR) in the United States. The

leader of such an organization may be responsible for coordinating intelligence operations in certain countries. The United Kingdom has a broad assessment body, such the Overseas Economic Intelligence Committee, and a specialist intelligence assessment organization. Wherever such accords exist, the exchange of intelligence, including evaluations, is generally recognized as an approved role between certain governments. There are a large number of intelligence operations that gather data. Their validity is tied to the interplay between circumstance (war or peace) and method. National leadership uses the processed data for both long-term and short-term threat assessment. Foreign policy stances, political maneuvers, economic policy indicators, weapon stockpiles, and weapon availability might all be subject to a long-term examination by civil and military authorities.

Management of Intelligence in India

The CCPA sits atop India's intelligence agency hierarchy. It is led by the Prime Minister (as Chairman) and includes the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, Home Minister, and Finance Minister. The Secretaries, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Directors of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) all work together to aid this body. The generalist bureaucrats in charge of several departments advise this highest political decision-making body. Decisions and policies on national security and foreign relations are supposed to be made by political leaders, who may or may not have the appropriate understanding of the problems involved, based on such advice. The Defense, Foreign Affairs,



Home Affairs, and Treasury departments each have their own intelligence networks. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is in charge of gathering information from inside the country, while the Research and Analysis Wing (R & AW) is in charge of gathering information from outside the country. Relevant data is also collected by the Department of Revenue Intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Border Security Force, and perhaps other agencies. In addition to this, the Army, Navy, and Air Force also have their own intelligence agencies (although tiny ones) that supplement the R & AW's work in this area of defense intelligence. National intelligence assessment and estimates are disseminated after being thoroughly analyzed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which receives information from the R&AW, the IB, the three branches of the Armed Forces, and other sources. The Cabinet, the Prime Minister's Office, and the relevant Ministries and Departments of the Government of India, as well as the Service Chiefs, receive the JIC's final intelligence report. Therefore, the JIC is empowered to provide the political leadership and policy planners with all available data for completing threat perceptions to India across all relevant domains and over the longer term. However, only the Ministry of Finance makes use of the data collected by the Economic Intelligence Council and the Department of Revenue.

National Security Council - Previous experiment of India

The political leadership of India agreed to implement a systematized process to coordinate security-related decision-making in order to better manage the

country's national security. The late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi originally suggested a kind of NSC in 1985 by establishing a group called the "Policy Planning committee on National Security"¹⁹. Members included both elected and appointed ministers (including two chief ministers). Secretary is now the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). While the CCPA (Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs) and the COS (Committee of Secretaries) were already in place, they prevented this body from fulfilling its potential as a think tank, decision maker, policy arbitrator, and performance monitor.

V.P. Singh, who was Prime Minister at the time, established a hierarchical NSC in 1990. The Prime Minister said that the NSC would be established so that it could "take a comprehensive and coordinated view of all matters relating to the security of the country" when he made the announcement in both Houses of Parliament. The Prime Minister will preside over the council, which will also comprise the Ministers of Defense, Finance, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. There may also be involvement from other Union Ministers and State Governors. Experts and subject matter professionals would be invited to attend council sessions. Both chambers have been presented with a resolution outlining the mandate and scope of the NSC. The Prime Minister said that such a structure was necessary because of the dynamic nature of both the external and internal environments. Taking into consideration both military and nonmilitary challenges, the NSC would work to develop a "integrated approach" to decision making that impacts national security.



Structure of the Existing Indian NSC

The Indian decision-making process has been seen to be delayed and reactive rather than proactive and predictive. National security decisions need for interdisciplinary research, a holistic perspective on the future, and a concerted policymaking effort. This is especially true for India, which confronts foreign threats, internal dangers cultivated from the outside (cross-border terrorism/transnational terrorism), and a plethora of other internal threats as the greatest obstacles to national security throughout the process of nation-building. The formulation of an overarching strategy to manage national security in today's world will need consideration of a broad range of political, social, economic, and military variables. The complexity of national security issues in India in the new century emphasizes the necessity for efficient handling of this issue through a solid framework. The National Security Council is the body that can tackle the issues in a way that is constant, focused, and coordinated. This multifaceted facet of national security need interdisciplinary training since careful and constant coordination between our internal and external policies is crucial to their success. The development of NSC was prompted by the need to develop an interdisciplinary strategy and a system of continuous measuring of security assessment. The issue is whether or not the current structure of the Indian NSC is suitable for this function. In India, the National Security Adviser oversees the NSC's three subcommittees—the Strategic Policy Group, the National Security Advisory Board, and the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) will function as NSC's third layer. Outside of government, they will be highly accomplished individuals with knowledge and experience in areas such as national security, strategic analysis, international relations, defense, the armed forces, homeland security, the economy, and science and technology. The National Security Council (NSC) relied on the board members to provide wider perspectives and expert advice on pressing issues. They were also supposed to contribute to increasing people's familiarity with and appreciation for national security problems. The Board was obligated to have regular monthly meetings and additional meetings as needed. The NSC will get a long-term forecast and analysis, as well as suggestions on how to proceed with addressing policy challenges brought to its attention. Twenty-two people will make up the advisory board.²⁶

The National Security Council and the Special Operations Executive would benefit from the services of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which would act as the NSC's secretariat. The secretariat was to be staffed by high-ranking officials from the government, the military, and the intelligence community, who would be responsible for the tasks listed below.

(a) addressing existing and emerging security threats; (b) acting as an early warning system on all strategic topics; (c) delegating responsibility for preparing documents for the NSC to the relevant Ministries, Interdepartmental Groups, and Task Forces.²⁷

An examination of the current setup of India's NSC



Scholars, academics, defense analysts, bureaucrats, journalists, military people, and others have debated the merits of the National Security Council and the institutions that support it since its establishment by the government of India. The majority of 'realists' are skeptical about its usefulness. Those who have waited decades for progress on this front have been left very disappointed by the end result. Instead of the antiquated bureaucratic structure, where power and responsibility are distant and the desire to innovate and adapt is lacking, the new dispensation was anticipated to take a contemporary management-oriented approach to the overall problem of national security. According to the results of this investigation, the practice is abnormal, and maybe even an abortion of the original idea. The establishment of the National Security Council has been likened by some to "the mountain in labour has produced a dead mouse."²⁸

The NSC's primary function is to "integrate all aspects of national policy to security affairs" by providing advice to the Cabinet and outlining policy choices for all security problems. In other words, NSC should serve as the hub organization for crisis management. The NSC is responsible for conducting the Strategic Defense Review and developing 162 prospective policies. National Security Council as a concept emerged after WWII. National security is "an interplay of national interests that are integrated as a cohesive system, which in turn converts the geographical unit into a political unit," according to the all-encompassing definition of the term. National interests is the key term here. Since self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial

integrity are conceptual and practical cornerstones of national security, it is appropriate to incorporate them in discussions of national interest. In order to achieve the ultimate goal of national interests — independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity — national security is only a means to an end.

A government's security philosophy is its stated principles for conducting foreign policy, domestic administration, and military operations.²⁹ The theory need not be flawless, but neither should it be hazy. It must be applicable to a certain context and time period in order to be considered legitimate. The evolution of doctrine always involves alterations and refinements. Conceptualizing national security is an intellectual activity much like elucidating any other substantial body of knowledge. It has to run deep inside the fabric of political ideology. In her constitution, India lays forth a clear political philosophy: go However, India has failed to develop a security philosophy, which has led to severe shortcomings in the country's defense plans and initiatives. India, as a nuclear power, cannot afford such slip-ups and must instead articulate a clear security philosophy. A systems perspective should be used in favor of a piecemeal one, and internal inconsistencies should be resolved. The Indian security philosophy should represent a balance between idealistic goals (such as the maintenance of peace, panchsheel, and non-alignment) and pragmatic considerations.

Since the Indian National Security Council is essentially the overarching political phenomenon, embodying attitudes and resulting policy decisions in relation to all other geopolitical entities and their



interests, the formulation of a purposeful, contentious, and effective "security doctrine" and "policy" should be its primary responsibility and thrust. Individual, societal, and national security demands must be evaluated as part of this process. In turn, this requires a thorough examination and categorization of the numerous interest groups that are important to one's continued existence and prosperity. A country's security strategy should thus take into account a wide range of factors, including the standard of living inside its borders, the safety of its citizens, its ability to manage the environment, and its economic outputs and inputs. Examining the threats that a state faces from inside, as well as from other states that see (incorrectly) the existence, survival, or direction of other states/nations as a threat and damaging to their own interests, is part of this process.³¹ Therefore, it would be arrogant to propose a cookie-cutter security strategy for India that would adequately represent the goals and aspirations of the country's citizens.

Since 1947, India's political leaders and administrations have avoided defining the country's approach to national security, ultimately failing to develop a coherent and effective policy. Governmental plans for maintaining national safety. A state's stance on matters crucial to its existence and continuity may be better understood via a security doctrine than through a defense strategy alone. Normally, a doctrine of this kind would be crafted with consideration for the country's unique characteristics, its rich history, the current political and economic climate, the hopes and dreams of its leaders for the future, the viewpoint of the armed forces, and the

advances in technology. The country's defense and security policies would be informed by such a national security philosophy.

Because its nature is not documented in any of the many official yearly reports of the government, and because it is not clearly expressed, "India probably, has not propounded a security doctrine." There has been little success in developing a long-term defense strategy despite the 1985 creation of the Defence Planning Staff (DPS) as an extension of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Unfortunately, the government did not green light the DPS's defense viewpoint plan. The 1990s planning effort was similarly unsuccessful because the gap between the original plan and the actual development that was achieved had become too wide. The administration also rejected a revised perspective plan covering the years 1992-2007. As a result, DPS failed in its primary objective, which was to articulate a national defense strategy. During a discussion in parliament on May 16, 1995, then-Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao (also the Defense Minister from 1993 to 1996)³⁴ said, "we do not have a document named India's National Defense Strategy.

CONCLUSION

To ensure national security, a country must protect its established norms and institutions. The meaning of this phrase may be used both at home and abroad. From an international perspective, this means that safeguarding a country's borders, government, and independence are the top priorities for every state. It would be official government policy to protect the country against internal non-military dangers such as political fragmentation, balkanization, subversion,



secession, religious extremism, ethnic and sectarian activity. There is more to national security than the absence of armed conflict in the post-Cold War era. The well-being of the people who constitute a nation-state includes their physical, mental, emotional, and financial security. With the advancement of science and military technology providing repressive weapon systems, the military and non-military dangers to a nation's acquired values have taken on a new significance⁴. Military activities, including Electronic Warfare, communications, clandestine intelligence, and others, have greatly expanded their potential to do massive damage. Countries with very diverse ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic populations may be more vulnerable to ideological and psychological forms of covert conflict.

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